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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK RIGGLE and GENEVA 
H. RIGGLE, his wife, 
Pla.intiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
DAINES MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant arnd Appellarn.t. 
Case No. 
10948 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The purpose of this case is to determine whether 
or not tlw Defendant-Appellant is liable for the balance 
due ou its promissory note in favor of the Plaintiffs-
Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
'l1he District Court by Decree dated March 28, 1967, 
granted Summary Judgment for the amount due on 
the promissory note in favor of the Plaintiffs-Respond-
rnts, including interest, attorney's fees and court costs. 
1 
On ..\larch 28, 1967, the Defendant-Appellant, ohjectc,1] 
to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg. 
ment, and by Order dated J\Iay 3, 1967, the Court denied I 
the Defendant-Appellant's objections. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment 
of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from Summary Judgment granted 
in favor of the Plaintiffs-Respondents by the Salt Lake 
County District Court upon finding no genuine issue ai 
to any material facts. 
The statement of facts offered by the Defendant. 
Appellant, Daines Manufacturing Company, Inc., here-
inafter ref erred to as "Corporation", is not entirely 
supported by the record in this cause. The Plaintiffs· 
Respondents are hereinafter referred to as "Riggle". 
The following statements in Corporation's Brief 
are inconsistent with the facts or not supported by the 
record: 
(a). On page 2 of Corporation's Brief, it 
is stated: '' ... the makers of said promissory 
note executed an employment contract with the 
Plaintiff . . . '' The note referred to was the 
$10,000.00 note, and no employment contract wi~b 
the partnership has been offered or proposed in 
evidence. 
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(b). On page 3 of Corporation's Brief, it is 
claimed that the p0rso11s executing the $10,000.00 
note were the incorporators of the Corporation. 
No evidence has been proposed in relation to this 
matter, and it is patently impossible, as at the 
time of incorporation, January 18, 1955, (R-18) 
the law required five incorporators (UCA 16-2-3). 
A check of the Secretary of State's office of the 
State of Utah indicates that the Corporation ac-
tually had ten (10) incorporators. Only four ( 4) 
parties constituted said partnership. 
( c). On page 8 of Corpora ti on 's Brief, in 
arguing Point II, the Corporation refers to an-
other case filed in the District Court by Riggle 
against the partnership, and there is no reference 
to this case or mention of it in the record. 
( d). On page 9 of Corpora ti on 's Brief under 
Point II, Corporation states: " ... The $9,612.58 
'mentioned above' ·was payment made by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiffs .... " This statement 
is not supported by the evidence. The only pay-
ments made by the Corporation to Riggle in this 
action are the salary payments and note pay-
ments indicated in Riggle 's affidavit (R-11), and 
under the terms of Corporation's affidavit (R-20) 
it is irnlicatecl that a major yiortion of snch 
amount resulted from miscellaneous payments 
made by partnership. 
( e). On page 10 of Corporation's Brief, the 
Corporation states: '' . . . the Defendant . . . 
was substituted as the employer in the new con-
tract ... '' There is no evidence to support this 
statement. 
In order to obtain a clear representation of the facts 
and the chronology thereof, they are restated, eliminat-
ing those items not supported by the record. 
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On July 8, 1954, Riggle loaned a partnership 
$10,000.00, which loan was represented by a promisson 
note (R-36). . 
The Corporation was incorporated in the State of 
Utah on January 18, 1955, (R-18, 46) six months and ten 
days subsequent to the issuance of the note above re-
f erred to. 
Five months and thirteen days after the birth of 
Corporation, it entered into an employment agreement 
with Riggle, such agreement requiring Riggle to act as 
a business and engineering consultant for Corporation 
and requiring Corporation to pay Riggle $150.00 per 
month (R-13). 
Corporation was seven months delinquent in its pay-
ments on the employment contract on August 1, 1957, 
and Riggle agreed to terminate the employment contract 
and Corporation's further liability for payments thereon 
upon receipt of a promissory note covering past-due 
payments (R-12, 47). On August 1, 1957, Corporatim1 
delivered to Riggle its promissory note covering the 
accrued but unpaid installments required by the employ-
ment contract (R-2, 11). Corporation made intermittent 
payments on the note, reducing the balance to $344.94 
ns of February 11, 1958 (R-2, R-11 par. 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
The promissory note is admitted as genuine and the 
signatures thereon are genuine (R-4, Admissions of 
Plaintiff). 
The Corporation, in its Statement of Facts, quote1 
extensively from an Affidavit of Darrel R. Daines, a11 
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,,fficcr of Corporation. Most of the Affidavit contains 
immaterial and inadmissible facts relating to events 
occuning before the birth of Corporation. 
It is important to note that there is no claim that 
Riggle was an incorporator or stockholder of Corpora-
tion or that there were any other or additional con-
tractual arrangements between Corporation and Riggle. 
The record is silent on any fact that would establish 
all obligation on the part of Corporation to enter into 
thr employment contract with Riggle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL TRANSACTION CANNOT 
BFJ RENDERED USURIOUS BY A SUB-
SEQUENT TRANSACTION. 
Corporation docs not claim that the promissory note 
in this action is usurious, but only that the Corporation's 
promissory note should be added to a prior partner-
~hip obligation, thereby making the prior obligation a 
nsurious transaction (R-36). It is then claimed that 
since the subsequent corporate transaction has been 
added to the prior partnership transaction, a usurious 
arrangement is created and the corporate transaction 
is a product of the usurious partnership transaction. 
If this theory of Corporation is sustained, it has created 
il'g·a] perpetual motion, for unlike and unrelated trans-
actions moving in concentric circles forever destroy one 
i111otlter. 
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Corporation's only obligations to Riggle arose some 
12 months after ::\Ir. Riggle had loaiwd $10,000.00 to a 
partnership (R-2, 36) when it executed an employment 
contract requiring Riggle 's services (R-11, 12, 13). 
Corporation now alleges that its obligation to Riggle 
was part of an earlier transaction between another party 
and the obligation should have a retroactive effect 
I 
thereby making the earlier transaction with the other 
party usurious. 
The employment contract and resultant promissory 
note covering past due wages cannot be a part of a 
transaction with another party accomplished before 
Corporation was born. 
Usury must exist in the original transaction. The 
contract or promissory note must be usurious at the 
time of its making. This rule has been adopted and 
affirmed in Utah: 
Page 427: '' ... The character of a contract with 
respect to usury is determined as of the time it is 
made. If it is then legal it cannot be rendered 
usurious hy subsequent transactions ... which .. · 
cannot impart the taint of usury to an antecedent, 
honest and legal agreement ... '' Cobb Y. Harte11-
stcin, 47 Utah 174, 152 P. 424 (1915). 
This rule has been affirmed in Utah in Seaboard 
Finance Company v. lVahlcn, et al., 123 Utah 529, 260 
P.2d 556 (1953). (See also 102 ALR 573-577.) 
The subject $1,050.00 note is a separate, distinct 
contract. The note was not executed until over three 
6 
rears after the occurrence of the instance claimed by 
Corporation to have been usurious, and has no causal 
connection with the partnership transaction. 
If, as claimed hy the Corporation, an employment 
contract existed between the partnership and Riggle, 
such employment contract could not have been binding 
upon the Corporation for as indicated in the Utah case 
of TV all v. Niagara Mining cf: Smelting Co. of Idaho, a 
contract of a predecessor to a corporation is merely 
an offer to the corporation which can either be accepted 
or rejE•cted by the corporation. 
Page 401 : '' . . . Where a contract is made by 
and with promoters, which is intended to inure 
to the benefit of a corporation about to be organ-
ized, such contract will be regarded as in the 
nature of an open offer, which the corporation, 
upon complete organization, may accept and 
adopt or not, as it chooses .... The liability of 
the corporation ... does not rest upon a supposed 
agency of the promoters, and a ratification of 
their acts, hut upon the immediate and voluntary 
act of the company .... " Wall v. Niagara Mining 
& Smelting Co. of Idaho, 20 Utah 474, 59 P. 399. 
Since the Corporation was under no obligation to 
employ Riggle then_, when it agreed to employ him some 
51h months after its incorporation, it created a new 
contract and obtained new benefits. 
Corporation cites from 55 Am Jur, Usury, 390 Sec-
tion 9G, wherein as a "black letter rule" it is in essence 
stated that a subsequent transaction will not cure a ~, 
transaction which is usurious at the date of inception 
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and the taint of usury attaches to the subsequent oblig~­
tion "if the descent can be traced". (page 12, Corpora-
tion's Brief.) In this case please note that the descent 
cannot be traced. The entire section of Am ,J ur deals 
with renewals of original obligations. 
Each of the three cases cited by the Corporation in 
support of its position are factually distinguishable from 
the case in hand. 
In the cases of Richardson v. Foster, et al., 170 P. 
321 (Washington), and Westman. v. Dye, 4 P.2d 134 
(California), cited by Corporation, the actions were ae-
tions on renewal transactions between identical partie~. 
The continuity of the transactions was apparent. 
In the Aspeitia v. California Trust Company case, 
322 P.2d 265 (California), cited by Corporation, the ac-
tion was by and for the benefit of the executor of the 
maker of the note and the Court indicated that the exec-
utor stood in the shoes of the maker and therefore con-
tinuity or identity of parties was preserved. 
The Corporation has cited no other cases or author-
ities, and as noted in each of the cases cited by Corpo-
ration, there is a continuity of parties and a direct 
nbility to trace the descent of the transaction. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER, 
FOR THERE ARE NO CONTESTED 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
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As indicated in the Corporation's Brief Summarv ' . 
,Judgment should not be granted if there is a genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and the cases cited by the 
Coq)oration to support this point reflect the applicable 
law. 
Corporation claims that it has raised issues m re-
lation to usury and failure of consideration. 
The determination as to whether or not there is 
failure of consideration is a legal determination and 
not a determination of a question of fact. The affirma-
tive statement of a conclusion of law in the Complaint 
of the Plaintiff docs not raise a factual question. 
The promissory note executed by the Corporation 
recites that it is issued "for value received" (R-2). 
The promissory note is admitted to be genuine and 
the signatures thereto genuine (R-4). 
The promissory note was given to confirm an 
amount owed to Riggle by the Corporation by reason 
of an employment contract (R-11, Riggle's Affidavit, 
and R-20, Affidavit of Darrel R. Daines, Corporation's 
Agent), and therefore consideration for the note is 
admitted. 
The agreed consider a ti on for the promissory note 
was the cancellation of the employment contract (R-12, 
par. 8) ·which had a remaining term of 35 months, and 
the promise to pay the amount of accrued, past due 
salary payments (R-11, 20). It is apparent that there 
are no questions of fact relating to consideration. The 
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Court determined as a matter of law that th(' consi(lrrn-
tion was sufficient (R-47, par. 4, 5). 
At the time Riggle loane(l the partnership $10,000.00, 
the Corporation was not yet horn and eonseque11tly, the 
Corporation could haw no ohligation to Riggle• (R-4i, 
par. 15). 
The record co11tai11s no faet that rais0 n question m1 
the consi<leration for the Corporatio11 's promissory nok 
The 011ly claim remaining is that the employment 
contract, (the cancellatio11 of "·hich was a porti011 of tlw 
consid('rntio11 for the promissory note), was a part of a 
usurious transaction. It therdore hecomes necessan· to 
tletermi11e \diat facts, if any, are claimed hy the Cor-
poration as supporting the contention that the employ-
ment contract was part of a usurious transaction, and 
if a k•gal c011clusion of usury can be drawn from these 
facts. 
The Corporation claims that oyer se,·e11 m011ths 
prior to its organization, Riggle loaned a pad11Nship 
$10,000.00, and the partnership agreed to pay such 
amount arnl emplo)· Riggle. 
Oral testimony as to <>xistence of a fiw-war em-. . 
plO)'ment contract would not he admissihle, as proof of 
the same \vould lw prohihite(l by th(• Stcitntc of Fraud~ 
(UCA 23-5-4 ( 1)). 
F,yide11tiary matter relating to tra11sactio11s occur-
ri11g before thl· Corporatio11 cam0 into existence cnnlll 
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not he admissible, for such facts would not be material 
to the transactions of the Corporation. 
Oral testimony as to the Corporation's agreement 
to assume and answer for the debt of the partnership 
would not be admissible under tlw Statute of Frauds 
(UC.A 25-5-4 (2) ). 
The employment contract executed by Corporation 
was a separate agreement of the Corporation and no 
material admissible evidence has been proposed by Cor-
poration that could relate this transaction to a prior 
partnership transaction and make it a part thereof. 
In neither the pleadings nor Affidavit has Corpora-
tion offered to prove that Riggle owned or controlled 
Corporation. Further, there is no offer to prove any 
contractual relationship between Riggle and Corporation 
pre-dating the employment contract. The Court found 
no such relatio11ship (R-47, par. 14, 15; and R-48, par. 
(), 8). 
The claim is that the Corporation entered into a 
contract of employment (R-19). The consideration for 
such employment was the services to be performed by 
Riggle as s<'t forth in the contract (R-13). 
l\fr. Riggle paid to the partnership the $10,000.00 
rn consiclera ti on of the partnership promissory note on 
.f ulv 8 19;)4 and the Corporation was organized six . , ' 
months later (R-18, 46). Further, Riggle did not at 
au~, time consent to the Corporation as an additional 
or :;;nhstitute obligor on the $10,000.00 note owed by the 
11 
partnership, as indicated by the fact that in Case No. 
155799 (referred to only in Corporation's Brief, page 
10), Riggle sued the partnership and the partners and 
not the Corporation, and the partners did not interplead 
the Corpora ti on. 
It is axiomatic that the Corporation cannot be bonnd 
by the acts of its predecessors or creators. This rule has 
been adopted and affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court: 
Page 400: '' ... that which has no existence can 
have no agent, and, in the absence of any act 
authorizing them so to do, can enter into no con-
tract, nor transact any business, which shall bind 
the proposed corporation after it becomes a dis-
tinct entity .... " Wall v. Niaga.ra Mining & 
Smelting Co. of Idaho, 20 Utah 474, 59 P. 399. 
and in the case of Murry v. Monter: 
Page 962 : '' . . . The general rule of law is that 
promoters who undertake to organize a corpora-
tion cannot bind the corporation by their con-
tracts and agreements made before the corpo-
ration was organized .... " Murry v. Monter, 
90 Utah 105, 60 P.2d 960. 
(Also refer to 18 Am Jur 2cl, Corporations, Section 18: 
18 CJS, Corporations, Section 122; 149 ALR 787 and 
797; 123 ALR 727.) 
The rule is both logical and necessary, for otherwise 
there is no way that the stockholders of the Corporation 
could he protected as indicated h.v this Honorable Court: 
Page 589: '' ... The only protection of the stock-
holders, and of subsequent corporate creditors, 
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against such a result lies in the rule that the 
corporation is not bound by the contracts of its 
promoters. The rule is just and should not be 
weakened .... " Tanrner v. Sinaloa Land & Fruit 
Co., 43 Utah 14, 134 P. 586. 
A contract with the predecessor of the Corporation 
is only an offer to the Corporation and if the Corpora-
tion chooses to accept such contract (off er), then a new 
contract arises as is stated in the Wall v. Niaga;ra case 
(supra). 
It ill behooves Corporation after it has negotiated 
the cancellation of $6,300.00 of indebtedness (the remain-
ing unpaid amount of the employment contract) for only 
$1,050.00 and ratified the entire transaction by making 
payments thereon to reduce the balance to $344.94 to 
now claim that the entire transaction was an error. 
The Corporation could have refused to enter into 
the employment contract, and Riggle would have had 
110 recourse. 
The Corporation need not have entered into the 
employment contract binding itself for four years, but 
of course, if it did not, it could not have required the 
services of Mr. Riggle during such period. After enter-
ing into the employment contract and defaulting in the 
performance thereof the Corporation need not have 
accepted the $5,250.00 net benefit resulting from the 
r·ancellation of the contract. In each instance, the Cor-
poration acted without compulsion and to its own benefit. 
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It is apparent that most of the evidence claimed hy 
Corporation wouhl uot he admissihle>, hut p\·en if a<i-
mitted could not affect the legal conclusions in this case. 
Corporation should not be allowed to avoid or delay 
the predictable consequC'nces of its premeditatC'd acts 
hy alleging inadmissible' and unrelated matters and re-
questing a trial thereof. 
The Judgment shoul(l lw affirmed and the' Corpora-
tion required to pay its contract. 
POINT III 
THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BY THE COURT WAS PROPER. 
Corporation admitted that the promissory note pro-
vides for a ttorne~- 's fees ( R-9, 35). 
The Court found the attorney's fees were rrason-
able (R-47, par. 12). 
The rnle controlling the reasonableness of attor-
ney's fees is stated in F.M.A. Financial Corporation "· 
Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2cl 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965): 
Page 673: '' ... Because both judges and lawyers 
hm·e special knowledge as to the value of legal 
services, this is not always required to be pr?Y~d 
ln- sworn testimony .... the judge may fix it tll 
tlie has is of his o~Yn knowledge and experience; 
and/or in connection with reference to a Bar 
approved schedule .... these would have pro-
vi<lr<l an e,·identiary hasis for making the deter- ' 
mi nation .... '' 
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'rhe above case had a very similar fact situation to 
the subject case. The plaintiff was granted summary 
judgment on a promissory note and was awarded attor-
ney's fees in accordance with a Bar schedule. No evi-
dence of attorney's fees was introduced, hut the Court 
did make a finding of fact of the reasonableness and 
granted judgment for fees. The defendant denied the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees, which this Court 
stated created an issue of fact. 
The case was remanded only for the purpose of 
taking evidence on attorney's fees. Corporation has not 
denied reasonableness of claimed attorney's fees. It has 
admitted the note provides for attorney's fees, but 
denied that there should be an award of attorney's fees 
hecausc it claims it has no liability on the promissory 
note ( R-35). 
Corporation has not made proffers of proof in 
respect to attorney's fees or denied the reasonableness 
of attorney's fees. The Corporation therefore has ad-
mitted the reasonableness of attorney's fees if it is 
found to he liable on the promissory note. 
CONCLUSION 
A simple case has been presented. A Corporation 
executed a promissory note (admitted genuine) to con-
firm a debt due and to obntin a contractual advantage. 
The Corporation did not pay the entire amount of the 
note and when sued, in search of a defense claimed that 
another entity had a usurious relationship with Riggle 
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before its existence and therefore that the Corporation 
is not liable. The defense is not proper. There is no 
continuity of parties. There is no possible way to con- , 
nect the transactions. There is no unity of time, place, 
purpose or parties. The defense has no continuity, and 
any evidence tending to establish continuity would not 
be admissible. 
Would the Court, in violation of common sense, the 
rules of evidence and the Statute of Frauds, allow Cor-
poration to adduce oral proof of events transpiring prior 
to its existence in order to avoid its just debts as re-
flected b~v written contracts? After three noYations, 
should the Court allow the Corporation to go back into 
ancient history in order to claim an "original sin" and 
taint all the descendants with such sin? The obvious 
answer is no. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact nor legal 
theory that ''rnuld justify trial of this cause. 
It is respectfully submitted that in order to effect 
the purposes of the Rules of Ci,·il Procedure, thereby 
providing for efficient and prompt administration of 
justice, this Court should sustain the .Judgment of the 
District Court. 
Respectfull~· snhmittecl, 
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